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 ESSAY
 LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT:
 LABOR PEACE AND THE EVOLUTION OF
 JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
 RonaldJ. Gihon* & MarkJ. Roe**
 In Japan, large firms' relationships with their employees differ from
 those prevailing in large American firms. Large Japanese firms guarantee
 many employees lifetime employment, and the firmsf boards consist ofinsider-
 employees. Neither relationship is common in the United States.
 Japanese lifetime employment is said to encourage firms and employees
 to invest in human capital. We examine the reported benefits of the firm's
 promise of lifetime employment, but conclude that it is no more than periph-
 eral to human capital investments. Rather, the "dark " side of Japanese labor
 practice?constricting the external labor market?likely yielded the human
 capital benefits, not the "bright" side of secure employment.
 What then explains the firm's promises of lifetime employment in Japan,
 a practice that developed following World War II, when labor was in surplus
 and hence economically weak? We hypothesize two political explanations,
 one "macro n and one "micro. " The "macro " hypothesis is that a coalition of
 conservative and managerial interests sought lifetime employment to reduce
 the chances of socialist electoral victories. The "micro" hypothesis is that
 managers tried to defeat hostile unions and win back factories from worker
 occupation, firm-by-firm, by offering lifetime employment to a core of workers.
 Neither the "macro" nor the "micro" goals were intended to improve human
 capital training, but rather to reduce worker influence, either in elections or
 in the factory. We assess the evidence for these hypotheses.
 We look at Japanese labor practices and related corporate governance
 institutions as "path dependent": A political decision "fixes" one institution
 and then the system evolves in light of that fixed institution by developing
 efficient complementary institutions.
 Introduction
 Large firms' relationships with employees differ in Japan from those
 prevailing in the United States. In Japan, large firms guarantee many
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 employees lifetime employment; in the United States, employment is typi?
 cally at-will, although actual tenure is often long-lasting. This difference
 is said to be of great importance in the Japanese system: Lifetime em?
 ployment for core workers is said to be at the center of Japanese corpo?
 rate governance and labor relations, is said to provide an incentive for
 firms to invest in the workers' human capital, and is said to be central
 enough to be supported by other Japanese governance institutions, such
 as cross-shareholdings, inside boards of directors, and the main bank sys?
 tem.1 In the United States, in contrast, workers have neither explicit nor
 implicit guarantees of permanent employment and the corporate govern?
 ance system rarely involves labor.
 We seek here to better understand these differences by offering hy-
 potheses about the origins and functioning of lifetime employment. Our
 analysis has three steps. First, lifetime employment as conventionally un?
 derstood in the United States is unlikely to have had the human capital
 advantages claimed for it by admiring American analysts. Second, its ori?
 gins lie more in politics and the struggle for labor peace than in the eco?
 nomics of developing human capital. Third, after it arose for political
 purposes, other governance institutions evolved to support efficient pro?
 duction. In our analysis, the firm's promise of lifetime employment (the
 "bright" side of Japanese labor practices) is tied to the lack of an external
 labor market in which employees could easily move from firm to firm
 (the "dark" side of Japanese labor practices), and this "dark" side proba?
 bly does more of the work in encouraging employee productivity and
 commitment to the firm than does lifetime employment.
 I. Lifetime Employment's Purported Incentives
 The conventional view is that Japanese firms promised lifetime em?
 ployment to give workers the proper incentive to invest in human capital,
 or that at least their promises had that as a primary effect.2 Alan Blinder
 states: "After all, because of the lifetime employment system, it is the core
 employees who . . . make extensive, immobile investments [of their
 1. See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey
 and Research Agenda, in The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength 11
 (Masahiko Aoki 8c Ronald Dore eds., 1994); Gerald T. Garvey 8c Peter L. Swan, The
 Interaction Between Financial and Employment Contracts: A Formal Model of Japanese
 Corporate Governance, 6 J. Japanese 8c Int'l. Econ. 247 (1992); Robert J. Gordon, Why
 U.S. Wage and Employment Behavior Differs From That in Britain and Japan, 92 Econ. J.
 13 (1982); Yoshitsugu Kanemoto 8c W. Bentley MacLeod, The Theory of Contracts and
 Labor Practices in Japan and the United States, 12 Manag. 8c Dec. Econ. 159 (1991); Paul
 Milgrom 8c John Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese
 Economic Organization, 9 Estudios Economicos 3 (1994); Jacob Mincer 8c Yoshio Higuchi,
 Wage Structures and Labor Turnover in the United States and Japan, 2 J. Japanese 8c Int'l
 Econ. 97, 110 (1988).
 2. See sources cited supra note 1.
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 human capital]."3 Others tell us that "[t]he lifetime employment system,
 combined with a ranking hierarchy, has served to encourage skill acquisi-
 tion on the part of workers and to maintain a high level of effort,"4 and
 go on to ask whether the United States could import lifetime employ?
 ment and its benefits.5 But, we shall argue, not the firm's promise of
 lifetime employment alone, but its complement?a closed external labor
 market, limiting employees' ability to move to other firms6?helped the
 Japanese labor market develop human capital investment incentives. Jap?
 anese firms may well invest in their employees' human capital, but they
 do so not because they have promised the employees lifetime jobs, but
 because their employees cannot readily move elsewhere.7 Importing life?
 time employment into the United States?with many American firms
 promising not to fire employees?(1) would not itself directly encourage
 human capital investment, and (2) to work at all in encouraging human
 capital investment, would need its complement, the absence of an exter?
 nal labor market?which does the heavy lifting in Japan, but which most
 Americans would find unacceptable.
 A. The Basic Argument: Generic and Industry-specific Skills
 Human capital is conventionally divided into two categories: gen?
 eral, which is valuable to many employers, and firm-specific, which is valu-
 able to only a single employer.8 In this section, we begin with general
 skills, said to be central to Japanese workers' attributes, particularly in
 their being able to move readily from one task to another.9 In the next
 section we look at firm-specific skills. For neither type of skill does the
 firm's promise to the employee ofa lifetime job directly induce either the
 3. Alan S. Blinder, More Like Them?, Am. Prospect, Winter 1992, at 51, 54; see also
 Garvey 8c Swan, supra note 1, at 247-48 ("One of the most prominently cited reasons for
 the success of postwar Japanese firms is their ability to maintain valuable implicit
 agreements with their employees [, agreements] . . . providing relatively stable employment
 . . . [in a] system [that] seems to encourage both high levels of individual effort and
 cooperation between employees."); Mincer 8c Higuchi, supra note 1, at 97 ("The starting
 point . . . is the proposition that intensive formation of human capital on the job is the
 basic proximate reason for the strong degree of worker attachment to the firm in Japan.");
 infra Part II.
 4. Kanemoto 8c MacLeod, supra note 1, at 167.
 5. See id.; see also Blinder, supra note 3, at 62.
 6. In internal labor markets, employees move inside the firm from job to job; in
 external labor markets, employees move from firm to firm.
 7. Lifetime employment is sometimes understood by Japanese analysts as a two-way
 street: Employers promise a lifetime job, and employees promise not to leave. The latter
 half of the bargain seems only dimly reflected in the American literature and it is this
 half?or its institutional cousin, a closed external labor market?that we believe best
 explains the pattern of human capital investment, and which would be anathema to most
 Americans.
 8. See Gary Becker, Human Capital 30-51 (3d ed. 1993).
 9. See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ.
 Lit. 1, 3-14 (1990).
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 employee or the employer to pay to develop the employee's human
 capital.
 1. The Weak Incentives to Invest in Employees9 General Human Capital
 When Labor Markets are Fluid. ? Imagine an economy in which deep gen?
 eral skills are important: Workers need to work in teams, to develop new
 skills as markets change, and to run different machines as technologies
 and customer tastes evolve. Who will pay for employees to develop these
 skills? When external labor markets are fluid, firms underinvest in their
 employees' human capital because other firms can poach the employees
 after they have been trained. The poaching firms can pay the workers
 more, because the poachers have no training costs. True, if their employ?
 ees received outside offers, the training firm could keep the employees it
 had trained by matching the competing firms' wage offers. But if the
 training firms matched the higher external wages after having already
 paid for the training, then they would earn nothing on their investments
 in training. The poaching firms and the employees would split the re?
 turns on the prior investments in training (minus the costs of relocation)
 for which the training firms paid; thus, the training firms would pay, but
 would get no return. Firms will anticipate these free-rider problems, or
 learn from their mistakes, and stop paying to train other firms' future
 employees. Employers accordingly lack the incentives to invest heavily in
 general human capital when their external labor markets are fluid.10
 Alternatively, employees could pay for their general skills themselves,
 as basic human capital theory suggests,11 either directly, by paying the
 tuition for training programs and education, or indirectly, by accepting a
 lower wage while they are being trained. (This is pardy the "American"
 solution.) When employees pay for all of their own training, employers
 have less reason to fear opportunism from poaching competitors or mi-
 grating employees. Employers may underinvest, but employees pay for
 their own general skills; or, for some, public investment in vocational ed?
 ucation may offset underinvestment by employers.
 Although employees might in general have incentives to develop
 their own human capital, any idea that employees at Japanese firms pay
 for most of their general human capital faces two problems here, one
 empirical and one theoretical. The empirical problem is that Japanese
 firms pay more of the costs of training in general skills than do American
 firms.12 Why do they pay more? And does the firm's promise of lifetime
 10. Japanese labor markets are not fluid, but we start our analysis with fluid labor to
 help lead to our conclusion, that it is the constricted labor market, not the firms' promises
 of lifetime employment, that induces investments in human capital.
 11. See Becker, supra note 8, at 34.
 12. See Chris Tilly 8c Charles Tilly, Capitalist Work and Labor Markets, in The
 Handbook of Economic Sociology 283, 300 (Neil J. Smelser 8c Richard Swedberg eds.,
 1994) (citing Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, Robert M. Solow, and MIT Comm'n
 on Indus. Productivity, Made in America 81-93(1989)); see also Daron Acemoglu 8c Jorn-
 Steffen Pischke, Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence, 113 QJ. Econ. 79 (1998)
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 employment facilitate its investment? That is the prineipal question we
 address in this paper.
 The theoretical problem is that employees are often ineffective buy-
 ers of human capital, because they are less informed than the employer
 about the skills needed for the future. Even if the employer offers gui-
 dance, employees may mistrust the employer, either as to the facts of
 what skills should be developed or, if the employee is to accept a lower
 wage now, as to whether the employer will compensate the employee
 later. And even if employees could determine the right skills in which to
 invest, they may be unable to afford to invest or be unwilling to invest.
 Credit markets for employees are imperfect, particularly for those at the
 beginning of their careers.
 Thus, neither the employer nor the employee has the right incen?
 tives to invest in general human capital: The employer fears losing its
 investment if the external labor market is fluid; the employee fears losing
 his or her investment if the employer reneges on the promised return
 and often neither knows what human capital fits with the market nor has
 the funds to pay for that investment. Firms and employees therefore un-
 derinvest in human capital. An economy that could invest more in the
 right kinds of human capital would perform better over time.
 2. Irrelevance of Lifetime Employment to Employees' Incentives. ? Could
 lifetime employment solve these problems? Would firms in a fluid exter?
 nal labor market offer lifetime employment to align the firm's and the
 employee's incentives to invest in this general human capital? We believe
 they would not.
 Suppose first that the lifetime employee pays for the general skills by
 taking a lower wage earlier in his or her career. Although lifetime em?
 ployment protects the employee's job, the employer who offers lifetime
 employment is not guaranteeing that future wages will be high enough to
 pay the employee back for his or her investment. Lifetime employment
 doesn't reduce employee mistrust much if wages remain flexible, and
 Japanese wages are said to be even more flexible than American wages.
 True, the labor market protects the employee here, but the theoretical
 problem with lifetime employment in a perfectly fluid labor market is
 that the labor market always protected the employee. The employee
 didn't need a promise of lifetime employment in the first place because
 the employee could have taken his or her skills onto the labor market. Of
 course labor markets aren't perfect and we analyze firms' and employees'
 incentives in imperfect labor markets below.13 But when skills are gen?
 eral and labor markets frictionless, a lifetime employee will pay to get
 those skills, as long as he or she can sell those skills to others, even if the
 firm where the employee happens to be working can reduce his or her
 (arguing that informational asymmetries among employers yield some incentives for firms
 to train their employees in general skills).
 13. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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 pay. The firm's promise of lifetime employment adds little, or nothing,
 to the employee's willingness to pay to acquire general skills in a fluid
 labor market.
 Similar weaknesses afflict the familiar claim that lifetime employ?
 ment encourages Japanese employees to train their own successors, be?
 cause with lifetime employment the training employee does not risk that
 he is training his own replacement. Lifetime employment only means
 that his job is safe, not that future wage increases are assured. Once a
 trainer trains a successor, the firm could lower the trainer's variable
 wages (or fail to raise them enough). Once again, lifetime employment
 alone does not solve the labor contracting problem.
 3. Irrelevance of Lifetime Employment to Employers' Incentives. ? But the
 interesting issue in Japan is why employers pay for their employees' general
 human capital. Lifetime employment is said to facilitate the firm's invest?
 ment, but we disagree with that view. Here's why.
 If the firm guarantees employees their jobs, then, if the external la?
 bor market were fluid, it would be "heads the employees win, tails the
 firm loses." Heads: If an employee developed good skills at the firm's
 expense, the employee could jump to another firm, which could profita-
 bly pay more because it paid no training costs. If employees could signal
 to potential new employers when they had acquired high skills, the result
 would be perverse: The employer who paid for training would tend to
 lose its best employees and be stuck with its worst ones. In this "reverse
 lemons market," a firm promising lifetime employment would be com?
 mitting itself to keep its least skilled employees. The firm, anticipating
 this unfavorable result, would invest less in its employees' general skills
 with lifetime employment than without it.
 So why do Japanese employers invest heavily in general and industry-
 specific skills? We hypothesize that they invest in their employees' skills
 not because ofthe friendly Japanese institution of firms' promising their
 employees lifetime employment?an institution often viewed admiringly
 in the American literature. Rather, a dark and gloomy closing of the ex?
 ternal labor market played a key role: Employees cannot change jobs,
 because the Japanese external labor market is weak, and deliberately
 weak. If they could change jobs easily, they could take along their gen?
 eral skills.14 It is the closed external labor market, not employers'
 promises to employees of lifetime jobs, that assures employers that they
 14. Chang and Wang present a model in which low worker turnover?i.e, reduced
 access to an external labor market?increases a worker's incentive to invest in general
 human capital to avoid being fired, the consequences of which are magnified by the
 decreased supply of alternative jobs. See Chun Chang 8c Yijiang Wang, A Framework for
 Understanding Differences in Labor Turnover and Human Capital Investment, 28 J. Econ.
 Behav. 8c Org. 91 (1995). While this model links employee human capital investment to
 access to an external labor market, the model differs from our analysis and from Japanese
 labor patterns, in that in their model the employees' investment is driven by the fear of
 being fired; that incentive is absent when employment is lifetime.
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 05:12:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 514 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:508
 can earn a return if they invest in their employees' general human
 capital.
 With the "dark" side of a weak external labor market in place, the
 firm can comfortably invest in its employees' general and industry-spe-
 cific skills, knowing that other firms will not raid its employees: The dark
 side makes the employee's general human capital an asset ofthe training
 firm. Even if lifetime employment played a role here, if it also needed a
 closed external labor market to work well, the package would be unattrac-
 tive to an American culture that values mobility.
 B. Firm-specific Skills
 Lifetime employment is also conventionally said to facilitate Japanese
 firms' investment in their employees' firm-specific human capital. But this
 conventional analysis also seems to us unlikely to be correct.
 1. Wage Flexibility and Firm-specific Human Capital. ? Suppose that
 the employees paid for their own firm-specific capital. If so, the firm
 could act opportunistically and later on "expropriate" the returns on
 those employees' investments.
 Here's how: Firm-specific human capital is worth more to the em?
 ployer than to its competitors, because the firm-specific skills are those
 that could help to make this firm more productive, not other firms. The
 employee's firm-specific skills include knowing the firm's proprietary
 processes or the quirks of its work-groups. Were the employee to invest
 in developing firm-specific skills, the employer could opportunistically
 pay the employee at the lower compensation level of the employee's next
 best job, a job at another firm that would not pay the employee for skills
 that the other firm could not use. Hence, the employer could reap the
 return from the employee's investment in herself.
 Because the employee at that time would have no higher paying al?
 ternative, the employee would accept the lower wage. But the employee
 could anticipate this unfavorable scenario when deciding whether to pay
 to develop his or her own firm-specific human capital in the first place,
 and, fearing the firm's potential opportunism, would underinvest in
 those skills.15
 15. Cf. Eirik G. Furubotn, A General Model of Codetermination, in Codetermination:
 A Discussion of Different Approaches 41, 46-48 (Hans G. Nutzinger 8c Jurgen Backhaus
 eds., 1989) (arguing that if workers must bear the costs of developing their own skills, they
 may choose instead those jobs that require only general skills). The same result follows if
 the employer pays for the employee's firm-specinc human capital, although more weakly.
 Because the employee must spend time to absorb the firm-specinc training, the employee
 invests time that he could have used to develop general and marketable human capital. If the
 employer pays the employee up-front for this foregone investment, then the employer
 cannot treat the employee opportunistically as to this investment, but if the employer
 promises to pay up later, then the employee's time investment is firm-specinc and at risk of
 employer opportunism.
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 Firms and employees can reduce the employing firm's potential for
 opportunism here by developing a good reputation for paying up later, a
 matter we will discuss below. Here, we want to focus on the fact that
 lifetime employment could not credibly reduce employer opportunism,
 because the employer gives up very litde of its power to be opportunistic
 by promising not to fire its employees.16 Once employees have invested
 in firm-specific human capital, it is not in the opportunistic firm's interest
 to fire them, but to exploit their wage vulnerability by lowering the em?
 ployees' salaries down to the employees' value on the labor market
 (rather than keep the employees' wages near their value to the firm).
 Conventional analysis seems to miss this.
 True, the firm's potential opportunism is not unlimited. If it tried to
 exploit too much, some disgruntled employees would become less pro-
 ductive or quit.17 Firms would find that they could exploit their employ?
 ees only once; thereafter the employees would not pay for new or deeper
 skills. Even if employees invested in one big chunk at the beginning of
 their careers, firms that lost a reputation for fairness would find future
 employees uncooperative and unwilling to invest to develop their own
 firm-specific human capital. The point is not that these risks of firm op?
 portunism are without cure, but that the firm's promise of lifetime em?
 ployment is neither sufficient nor necessary to the cure.
 2. The Firm's Investment in its Employees' Firm-specific Human Capital. ?
 We do not dispute that Japanese firms invest in their employees' human
 capital, but we do dispute whether the firm's promise of lifetime employ?
 ment explains why. If the firm pays for the investment, it risks that an
 employee may quit. The firm's unwillingness to pay for the skills is in?
 duced by the employee's potential to quit, a potential that lifetime em?
 ployment does not directly affect.
 Once again other institutions may make firms willing to invest in
 human capital. For example, firms may invest in a way that allows them
 to pay the employees something above their opportunity-wage, thereby
 reducing the level of quits. The back-loaded wage scale over employees'
 careers fits this pattern. We have no quarrel with such models (and con?
 tribute to them below), but we again claim that lifetime employment is
 not critical to these models; the closed labor market in Japan might be,
 but this is not the Japanese institution attractive to Americans.
 3. Industry-specific Human Capital. ? Much purportedly firm-specific
 human capital is actually industry-specific human capital.18 A worker
 16. Milgrom and Roberts, supra note 1, include lifetime employment as one of the
 barriers to opportunism.
 17. See infra Part V.B., but this possibility is second-order (if relevant at all).
 18. The literature focuses on the firm-specific human capital of the Japanese
 employee. See, e.g., Yukiko Abe, Specific Capital, Adverse Selection, and Turnover: A
 Comparison ofthe United States and Japan, 8 J. Japanese 8c Int'l Econ. 272 (1994); Mincer
 8c Higuchi, supra note 1. But we view many of the skills as principally industry-specific, an
 idea Charles Sabel develops in Ungoverned Production: An American View of the Novel
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 who can use a lathe or a software system at a firm, or who has the flexibil-
 ity skills associated with just-in-time automobile production, can use
 much the same skills at any firm in the industry. An employee with re-
 course to an external labor market has the incentive to acquire industry-
 specific skills, because even if the firm reneges, the employee "owns" the
 skills and can "sell" them elsewhere in the industry.19 Yet when employ?
 ment is certain, but mobility impossible, employees will spend less time
 and money acquiring skills, because of the already-discussed risk of em?
 ployer opportunism. The employer's incentive to pay for specific skills
 increases, but only because a closed external labor market bars employee
 opportunism. The employer comes to "own" the human capital. In a
 U.S.-style external labor market, the uncertainty of the firm's employ?
 ment commitment may increase the employees' motivation to keep their
 industry-specific skills high.
 Lifetime employment?in the sense of the employer's promise to the
 employee of a lifetime job?thus seems unlikely to directly induce either
 the employer or the employee to invest in industry-specific skills. If the
 employee can sell those skills to others in the industry, it is that capacity
 that motivates the employee to buy the industry-specific skills himself or
 herself, and lifetime employment adds little or nothing. And, if the em?
 ployee could sell those skills in a robust external labor market?some?
 thing the employee cannot do in Japan?then the firm would be de-
 terred from paying for those industry-specific skills. (And, to be clear
 again here: Our view is that it is the closed external labor market that yields
 the human capital benefits, not the firms' promises of lifetime employ?
 ment.) The hard question now is this: If lifetime employment promises
 from the employer do so little to enhance labor market skills investments,
 why did the Japanese firms promise it?
 II. Why Lifetime Employment?
 Lifetime employment resulted more from political than from
 human-capital based economic forces. Once the institution was in place,
 complementary institutions developed that served to support human
 capital.
 A. Structure of a Historical Account
 Seeking the historical roots of lifetime employment risks seeing cau-
 sation where there is none. Hindsight can give the illusion of causation
 because events earlier in time were followed by later events. Without
 Universalism of Japanese Production Methods, in Corporate Governance Today 211
 (Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, May 1998). The basic
 skills of employees at one large firm in an industry may resemble the skills of employees at
 another large firm in the same industry. See Hideshi Itoh, Japanese Human Resource
 Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory, in The Japanese Firm, supra note 1,
 at 233, 249.
 19. But see infra note 88 and accompanying text for impeding frictions.
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 more, however, random sequencing and tight causation are equally
 compelling.20
 Similarly, the conventional claim that lifetime employment is rooted
 in Japanese culture21 (and needs no more explanation) is not enough.
 Indeed, it would be remarkable if a key economic institution were anti-
 thetical to a country's culture; either the institution would change or the
 culture would change. At times in the early twentieth century many mid-
 career Japanese employees moved to other companies, and at other times
 employers fired many mid-career employees. Culture and practice can
 diverge or converge. If culture and practice are now consistent (if we
 assume that lifetime employment really fits better with Japanese culture
 than does a fluid labor market, an assumption we doubt is correct), then
 one must wonder what made the two finally converge after decades of
 divergence.
 A historical inquiry runs another risk: Complex facts allow for alter?
 native accounts. How much labor turnover contradicts a statement that
 lifetime employment is present? Suppose half the workforce turns over.
 But then half the workforce is permanent. Is employment therefore life?
 time or is it at-will? Finding that firms fired workers in Japan before
 World War II, as we do, presents the same problem: Were those who
 were fired those who, under the post-World War II pattern, would have
 been lifetime employees? We will not debate these facts; we will only note
 that the literature portrays lifetime work as central for an important seg-
 ment of the labor force for postwar large Japanese firms, and we accept
 this as fact.
 We also do not aim here to authoritatively account for lifetime em?
 ployment's historical origins; that account should come from authors
 with other skills. We instead sketch a path-dependent account that the
 literature supports, with hypotheses that others will have to test.
 History and politics shape some initial conditions from which the
 economy evolves. Complementary institutions develop that push the sys?
 tem to efficiently combine institutions, given the fixed starting point. We
 see Japanese labor history through a lens that highlights a need for polit?
 ical peace at a key moment. In examining this history, some of which is
 20. See generally Michael J. Piore 8c Charies F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide:
 Possibilities for Prosperity (1984); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
 Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641 (1996).
 21. See, e.g., James G. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory: Aspects of its Social
 Organization (1958). It is also possible that deep historical culture was a convenient
 distortion for those who would benefit from reducing employee mobility. See Andrew
 Gordon, The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955, at 395
 (1985) ("Managers hoping to recoup their investment in training [inexperienced] workers
 had good reason to stress the mutual commitment of firm and employee on every possible
 occasion .... They had motive, even, to invent the notion of a loyal 'permanent
 commitment' among workers as part of the elusive good old days . . . .").
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 well-known to labor scholars, some not, we observe path-dependent adap-
 tation from political starting points.
 History does not happen all at once. It does not fix a starting point
 and then release the economy for evolutionary development without fur?
 ther political influence. Economic evolution and political influence are
 intertwined and simultaneous. But enough happened more or less at
 once in postwar Japan that we can abstract a plausible starting point.
 B. Structure Before the End of World War II
 Stable employment is not a continuous Japanese cultural tradition.
 Indeed, just after the first World War, when Japanese labor markets were
 tight, skilled workers often changed jobs. Employment was impermanent
 because employees had an external labor market: Yearly turnover rates
 of around seventy-five percent were the norm in most industries during
 World War I.22 While firms tried to reduce turnover with wage and sen-
 iority policies that would become familiar in post-World War II Japan,
 such as year-end bonuses, seniority bonuses, and regular pay raises, these
 experiments failed to stymie labor turnover:
 So long as economic conditions made job-switching easy, and
 experienced workers saw movement as the best way to advance
 in skill, wages penalizing skilled job switchers would be self-de-
 feating: they would not attract the best workers. Skill rather
 than seniority, therefore, had to remain a fundamental determi-
 nant of a worker's income in this era, despite varied efforts to
 change matters. This, in turn, encouraged or allowed mobile
 workers to continue moving.23
 The Japanese economic downturn of the 1920s led to labor surplus,
 and the labor surplus eroded companies' enthusiasm for seniority incen?
 tives; many firms retreated from their prior commitments to seniority bo?
 nuses, regular pay raises, or retirement funds. Firms then began to re-
 cruit inexperienced workers directly out of school and gave them on-the-
 job training.24 "[A] newly attractive pattern of long-term or career em?
 ployment began to take shape . . . in the 1920s, but we must not exagger-
 ate the extent ofthe change. Insecurity and short-term commitment (on
 22. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 87. Gordon says the surveys show voluntary
 separations ranging from 20% to 70% of total turnover, and concludes "that the traveling
 worker, polishing his skills through movement from job to job, remained dominant" as the
 1920s began. Id. at 94. Gordon emphasizes Japanese cultural features that differ from the
 employer paternalism that is said sometimes to explain lifetime employment. He stresses a
 craft pattern where skilled journeymen, licensed by guilds following apprenticeships,
 moved from master to master to sharpen their skills. "The footloose traveler . . . of the
 Meiji period, who moved with alacrity between factories and shipyards . . . [was] following
 time-honored customs." Id. at 22.
 23. Id. at 96; see also id. at 98-101 (describing efforts to use seniority promotions
 during this period).
 24. See id. at 63, 129.
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 both sides) continue [d] to dominate. . . ,"25 Voluntary mobility de-
 creased, but the job shortage that resulted from the economic downturn
 best explains the employees' decreased mobility.26
 Lifetime employment did not take root during this period, because
 employers neither promised to refrain from, nor did they actually refrain
 from, laying off employees during economic downturns. When jobs be?
 came scarce and an over-supply of workers ensued, "employers were
 ready to fire when business was slow, and seniority was no guarantee of
 exemption. To the contrary, they more often fired the older worker with
 seniority, but very likely declining skills as well. Throughout the decade,
 management fired workers and reduced work-force size."27 Even when
 elements of lifetime employment from time to time appeared, it was tem-
 porary labor market conditions, not a long-term commitment to lifetime
 employment, that induced them. Quitting was common when labor was
 in short supply, and firings began when labor was in surplus.
 Employment instability continued in the 1930s and the war years,
 even as better economic conditions tightened the external labor mar?
 ket.28 As in the tight World War I market, firms offered pay and training
 to induce employee loyalty, but to little avail. Skilled workers again
 moved between large companies. "The reemergence in the late 1930s of
 such mobility between large factories is a signal that policies to retain work?
 ers, some dating back to World War I or the 1920s, were of limited
 impact."29
 During World War II the Japanese government tried to shape the
 external labor market.30 In April 1939, it restricted employers from pirat-
 25. Id. at 133. Aoki accepts this assessment of the period. See Aoki, supra note 1, at
 30.
 26. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 139. Taira reaches a similar conclusion: "Behind
 this [labor] stability in the 1920s was the generally stagnant state of employment, which
 culminated in the depression of 1929-1931." Koji Taira, Economic Development and the
 Labor Market in Japan 154 (1970). Taira also notes the difference between the reality of
 workforce conditions and the ideal type contemplated by the tentative structural reforms
 of the 1920s. He stresses the problem of investing in training when "there was no
 guarantee that the internally trained workers would not change jobs before the investment
 in their training was recouped." Id. at 158-59. Carl Mosk, Competition and Cooperation
 in Japanese Labour Markets 76-78 (1995), however, places more emphasis on these
 interwar structural changes.
 27. Gordon, supra note 21, at 139-40.
 28. Gordon reports that by 1934, skilled workers fired during the 1920s had been
 rehired, and that by 1937 an acute shortage of skilled labor had developed. See id. at 156.
 29. Id. at 158. Gordon recounts the experience of a company that lost 42% of its
 skilled work force in a single year. See also Masami Nomura, Shushin Koyoo [Lifetime
 Employment] 187-90 (1994) (long-term employment was tried in 1920s, but did not stick).
 30. Government policies during World War II shaped many postwar Japanese
 institutions. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 30-31; Masahiko Aoki, Unintended Fit:
 Organizational Evolution and Government Design of Institutions in Japan, in The Role of
 Government in East Asian Economic Development 233, 236-40 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds.,
 1997); Takeo Hoshi, Cleaning-up the Balance Sheets: Japanese Experience in the Post-
 War Reconstruction Period, in Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider
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 ing other firm's workers. To hire a new employee, a firm needed govern?
 ment approval; to hire a skilled worker, the firm needed permission from
 the employee's former employer as well. By 1941, firms needed the gov?
 ernment to approve all of their hiring, firing, and voluntary termination;
 in effect the government tried to freeze all workers in their existing
 jobs.31 But, while turnover did drop, even government directives failed to
 end all turnover: "Skilled workers . . . remained ready to shift jobs, even
 illegally, throughout World War II."32
 Thus, from World War I through the end of World War II, worker
 mobility in external labor markets eroded labor stability when labor was
 tight, and employers' willingness to fire even senior workers eroded labor
 stability when labor markets were not tight. Employers tried but failed to
 build wage and seniority structures to induce workers to stay during labor
 shortages. Government intervention reduced but failed to stop turnover.
 Workers were mobile and employers poached, even when mobility and
 poaching were illegal.
 C. Post-World War II Labor Markets
 Labor was initially in surplus in the post-World War II Japanese la?
 bor market, just as it was in the early 1930s, but with both the size of the
 surplus and its consequences writ far larger in a devastated economy.33
 Andrew Gordon writes that after World War II "companies quickly turned
 to mass dismissals. Millions lost their jobs."34 The import of job loss was
 ofthe highest order: "Fear of starvation [was common] . . . .Japan lacked
 an effective public-welfare system, and, in 1945 or 1946, the threat of un-
 employment was literally a threat to survival."35
 During earlier economic setbacks, Japanese firms fired workers. The
 immediate post-World War II period was less favorable to lifetime em?
 ployment than the pre-War period?labor was abundant, people without
 Control and the Role of Banks 303 (Masahiko Aoki 8c Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995); Hideaki
 Miyajima, The Transformation of Zaibatsu to Postwar Corporate Groups?From
 Hierarchically Integrated Groups to Horizontally Integrated Groups, 8 J. Japanese & Int'l
 Econ. 293 (1994); Yukio Noguchi, The 1940 System: Japan under the Wartime Economy,
 88 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers 8c Proceedings 404, 404 (1998); Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese
 Firm Under the Wartime Planned Economy, 7 J. Japanese & Int'l Econ. 175 (1993); see
 also Takeo Hoshi, Evolution of the Main Bank System in Japan, in The Structure of the
 Japanese Economy: Changes on the Domestic and International Fronts 287 (Mitsuaki
 Okabe ed., 1995).
 31. See Sheldon Garon, The State and Labor in Modern Japan 225 (1987); Gordon,
 supra note 21, at 267, 272.
 32. Gordon, supra note 21, at 274.
 33. See Garon, supra note 31, at 180.
 34. Gordon, supra note 21, at 362.
 35. Id. at 363. "[A]ctual production for 1946 was down 70 percent from 1934-1936
 levels. Tokyo and Osaka . . . [saw] 60 percent of all buildings destroyed .... Rice
 production was seriously deteriorating. For city dwellers, starvation was not only possible
 but imminent." John Price, Japan Works: Power and Paradox in Postwar Industrial
 Relations 38-39 (1997).
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 05:12:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1999] UFETIME EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR PEACE 521
 jobs starved, and firms could hire at low wages and fire at will. Yet life?
 time employment emerged during this period of labor surplus. That labor
 surplus and lifetime employment occurred simultaneously presents a puz?
 zle?a puzzle that standard economic motivations fail to explain, but that
 politics can.
 1. Labor Strife. ?Organized labor in Japan gained power during the
 two years following World War II's end. Labor strife was common, and
 the American occupation authorities induced some of it. The Trade
 Union Law of 1945, enacted at the urging of the occupation administra?
 tion, SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers), to bring democracy
 to Japan, guaranteed workers the right to form unions and to strike.36
 Workers, fearing and experiencing mass layoffs, used both rights: They
 formed unions and they struck. Unions had 381,000 members when the
 Trade Union Law was enacted,37 more than 3,000,000 a year later, and
 nearly 5,000,000 by the end of 1946.38
 These strikes threatened managers in ways beyond just halting pro?
 duction; workers sometimes literally took over and ran the factories with?
 out the managers. The workers paid themselves, paid the factory's other
 costs, and then deposited any residual in a company bank account.39 The
 first such "takeover" occurred in the fall of 1945 and, within the first six
 months of 1946, Japanese managers faced 255 such "takeover strikes."40
 After a 50-day strike at Toshiba in 1946, for example, labor won for them?
 selves basic elements of managerial control of the factories.41
 By 1947, SCAP had changed its mind about Japanese unions, coming
 to see then-prevailing union activity as threatening America's new anti-
 communist Cold War strategy. Japan's new role, in SCAP's plan, was to
 be a capitalist bulwark against communism. Worker control of produc?
 tion threatened that plan, so SCAP abandoned its pro-union policy of
 1945 and prodded Japanese managers to reassert control. In 1947, Japa?
 nese unions planned a general strike, but SCAP barred them from strik-
 ing and then encouraged the Japanese Parliament to ban all public sector
 36. Gordon, supra note 21, at 331-32.
 37. See Mosk, supra note 26, at 95-96.
 38. See Garon, supra note 31, at 238; Gordon, supra note 21, at 331.
 39. See Mosk, supra note 26, at 96.
 40. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 332.
 41. See Price, supra note 35, at 54; Kiyoshi Yamamoto, Toshiba Rongi?1949
 [Toshiba Dispute?1949] (1983); see also Nobuhiro Hiwatari, The Origins of Japanese
 Lifetime Employment, in Employees' Role in Corporate Governance (Margaret Blair &
 Mark J. Roe eds., forthcoming 1999) (discussing "militant labor offensives" of the late
 1940s) (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review). But see Joe Moore, Japanese
 Workers and the Struggle for Power: 1945-1947, 214-15 (1983) (arguing that the violent
 Toshiba strike yielded the union mixed results and its ferocity deterred other firms from
 taking on the unions).
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 employees from striking.42 American tanks supported Japanese police at
 least once in ousting workers.43
 Toshiba's managers, encouraged by American authorities and
 Japanese officials who wanted an example, began an antilabor offensive
 in 1948, shutting down labor-controlled Toshiba factories by physically
 regaining control and removing key machines, dismissing workers, buy-
 ing other workers' voluntary resignations, and ending labor union au?
 thority over basic management of Toshiba factories.44 SCAP's concern
 over Communist influence within the labor movement culminated in
 1950 with the Red Purge; 12,000 employees said to be Communist Party
 members were fired from their jobs and barred from union activity. Ex?
 isting, often communist-influenced unions were replaced with more co-
 operative enterprise unions.45 At the same time, socialists threatened to
 win legislative victories, leading to our first political hypothesis.
 2. Peace as a Predicate to Production. ? A plausible political strategy
 for managers or conservative politicians would have been to split a labor
 coalition by privileging one influential segment of labor through lifetime
 employment, in return for reducing the size of the labor force and in?
 creasing management control over the rest of production. The impetus
 could have come from the top down: Conservative political and business
 leaders decide on lifetime employment for favored sectors to diminish
 the chance of socialist electoral success in response to economically in-
 duced industrial restructurings. "Macro" politics could have led to a
 "deal" that allowed restructuring while at the same time bringing social
 peace, suppressing radical labor, and reducing the chance of a socialist
 electoral victory by privileging one sector of labor.46
 The impetus also could have been "local" and "micro," which is
 where our second political hypothesis begins: When managers sought to
 rationalize production in a restructured firm, they might have privileged
 the surviving employees with lifetime employment, to reduce post-restruc-
 turing labor unrest.47 If many firms faced the same need to downsize,
 their senior managers may have decided on the same solutions, which
 would have gathered momentum as each firm acted. Then, in this bot-
 tom-up story, government institutions may have confirmed the norm that
 42. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 332-33; Mosk, supra note 26, at 96-97.
 43. See Price, supra note 35, at 66.
 44. See Yamamoto, supra note 41.
 45. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 333; Mosk, supra note 26, at 96; Price, supra note
 35, at 83-97.
 46. "In exchange for union acceptance of the performance-based wage system and
 limited union input in regulation ofthe workplace, workers received some job security ....
 This 'deal' had evolved at the workplace level in the 1950s," after the large layoffs that
 occurred in the late 1940s. Price, supra note 35, at 253. Price reports 400,000 layoffs in
 the private sector during only part of 1949. See id. at 76 tbl.5.
 47. "Management then carried out massive layoffs and a purge of radical union
 leaders .... Then to reunite the [remaining] employees, management and new unions
 emphasized employment security . . . ." Hiwatari, supra note 41.
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 many individual managers (and the surviving employees) had chosen in a
 deal to bring about labor peace.48 (We do not mean that there was a
 single, one-time, economy-wide transaction. This "deal" seems to have
 come out of multiple disputes, and was perhaps cemented by an emer-
 gent norm or "macro" political understanding.) This explanation is
 "political" in that the firms used lifetime employment not for the contrac?
 tual goals of inducing skills development, but for the "political" goal of
 downsizing without energizing radical labor organizations.49
 We paint a grim picture: Workers struggle to survive, workers and
 managers struggle to control the factories, the American occupation au?
 thorities first foster and then seek to crush strong unions, and in the end
 a deal is cut. Although grim, we believe this picture is realistic. A more
 positive spin on the same basic facts would see employees as seeking se?
 curity, community, and dignity, and see managers resisting at first and
 then acceding to some workers' demands for security, a security that
 makes the favored workers more willing to cede control to manage?
 ment.50 Whatever spin one prefers, human capital considerations do not
 motivate the adoption of lifetime employment.51
 * * *
 48. For example, the "deal"?employment security in return for labor peace and
 cooperation?is reflected in the principles associated with the government-sponsored 1955
 founding of the Japan Productivity Center. See Price, supra note 35, at 152-54.
 49. Daniel Raff argues that when Henry Ford announced his famous five-dollar day
 for workers whose next best job opportunities paid half as well, he quite plausibly was
 buying them away from the Wobblies, because he feared his new assembly line method was
 conducive to organizational appeals from the Wobblies. See Daniel Raff, Wage
 Determination Theory and the Five-Dollar Day at Ford, 48 J. Econ. Hist. 387 (1988).
 Support for a Japanese parallel can be seen in the following sources: Toshihiro
 Nishiguchi, Strategic Industrial Sourcing?The Japanese Advantage (1994) (suggesting a
 political component to the lifetime employment bargain, although acknowledging efforts
 along these lines in the interwar period); M. Shalev, Class Conflict, Corporatism and
 Comparison: A Japanese Enigma, in Japanese Models of Conflict Resolution 60, 71 (S.N.
 Eisenstadt 8c Eyal Ben-Ari eds., 1990):
 [During the] "offensive against labour during 1949, . . . state policies (mass lay-
 offs and the rescinding of union rights in the public sector . . .) [induced] major
 private employers . . . to reassert their authority. Management [won] . . .
 showdowns with militant enterprise unions. At the same time, the big firms
 accepted union demands for job security and linking wages to worker [age]".
 50. In return for supporting employment stability, managers got functional control
 over the workplace: the freedom to adjust working conditions, including employee
 transfer. See Takashi Araki, Flexibility in Japanese Employment Relations and the Role of
 the Judiciary, in Japanese Commercial Law in an Era of Internationalization 249, 269-71
 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).
 51. The "grim" narrative resembles that of Japanese labor scholars here, with the
 happy view more common in American views of Japanese labor history. See Andrew
 Gordon, Contests for the Workplace, in Postwar Japan as History 373, 374 (Andrew
 Gordon ed., 1983).
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 By the mid-1950s, the central features of lifetime employment were
 in place: fixed employment for part of the workforce, with the rest of the
 workforce made up of temporary workers, whose numbers could be
 shrunk or expanded as economic conditions demanded. The favored
 portion of the workforce and the company were protected from changes
 in the external labor market by the shock absorption capacity of tempo?
 rary workers, many of whom were women.52
 Encouraging workers to invest in developing firm-specific human
 capital need not have been the goal either of the American occupation
 authorities intent on building a capitalistic Japan, or of Japanese manag?
 ers intent on regaining control of their factories and breaking militant
 unions. Japan reached a political solution to an explicidy political con?
 frontation: control over production and management authority.
 We do not dismiss economic efficiency as a selection mechanism, but
 at times politics "trumps" private economic goals. Afterward, we believe,
 conditions settle and then economic selection and evolution act on these
 newly "initial" conditions. Once politics defined for Japan one political
 "given"?lifetime employment for some workers?Japan's economic
 problem was to craft associated institutions that could function effectively
 given the politically imposed lifetime employment. Lifetime employment
 was more a part of the peace predicate than of the productivity
 supplement.53
 III. The Strength of the Political Deal
 But why did the political deal?lifetime employment and a closed
 external labor market?persist when the labor surplus disappeared dur?
 ing the economically strong 1960s?54 Why didn't employers again poach
 52. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 400 ("The prominence of temporary workers in the
 Japanese settlement of the 1950s suggests that the group of full members made gains only
 at the expense of people on the margins.").
 We have not tracked the history of an additional core component of Japanese labor
 structure: enterprise unionism, in which a company-bounded union promotes a
 cooperative relationship between lifetime employees and management. See, e.g., Kazuo
 Sugeno 8c Yasuo Suwa, Labour Law Toward the 21st Century: Supporting Individual
 Workers in the Labour Market (Japan Int'l Labour Law Forum Paper No. 7, Mar. 1996)
 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Professor Hiwatari, supra note 41, says enterprise
 unionism arose from the same forces that gave rise to, and were part of the same package
 as, the lifetime employment bargain.
 53. Peace is a prerequisite to production, so deals that keep peace are not without
 efficiency properties. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1998) (discussing
 how political backlashes can disrupt systems otherwise thought to be efficient or lead to
 others designed to avoid more serious backlash). The question posed then is whether the
 firms' promises of lifetime employment were the "peace" predicate, as we argue seems
 plausible, or part of the productivity "supplement."
 54. See Tadashi Hanami, Labor Relations in Japan Today 32 (1979).
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 employees from competitors? Why didn't employees again become
 mobile?55
 We offer four noncompeting hypotheses. Two see employers for-
 bearing from laying off employees; two see employers forbearing from
 poaching.
 The first hypothesis is that individual managers remembered the
 postwar labor strife and feared that if they ended lifetime employment in
 their firm, they would have had to confront labor but would have been
 isolated and likely to lose.56 Labor disputes in declining indus tries surely
 reminded managers of the potential for strife in their own. The Miike
 coal strike was the most famous example. The Japanese coal industry was
 unprofitable by 1959, and Mitsui planned large layoffs at its mines. When
 the union at the Miike mine, one of the most radical in Japan, resisted,
 management locked labor out, and in July 1960, 20,000 strikers and labor
 activists violently confronted 10,000 policemen.57
 The second hypothesis is that Japanese courts buttressed lifetime em?
 ployment.58 Although the basic Japanese employment rule was "employ?
 ment at will" with notice,59 Japanese courts responded to the "scarcity of
 employment opportunities in the chaotic post-War economy,"60 with an
 55. Earlier employer agreements not to hire each other's employees, as well as
 employer efforts to persuade employees to forgo mobility, were unsuccessful. See Taira,
 supra note 26, at 112-16.
 56. While this concern would be less significant during the economic expansion
 starting in the late 1950s and ending with the oil shock in 1973, it would be significant in
 the period of restructuring that followed. It would also account for the provisions of the
 1974 Employment Insurance Law, which provided "employment adjustment benefits"?
 subsidies?to firms trying to maintain employment levels in the face of economic adversity.
 See Kazuo Sugeno, Japanese Labor Law 34 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992). Kazuo Sugeno is
 frequendy viewed as the leading Japanese labor law academic. One could see this
 managerial action as an economic agency cost to shareholders of management separated
 from ownership, if the risk was more of psychological pain to the manager than of labor
 strife that would damage the firm's stockholders.
 57. See Sheldon Garon 8c Mike Mochizuki, Negotiating Social Contracts, in Postwar
 Japan as History 145, 159-60 (Andrew Gordon ed., 1993); Price, supra note 35, at 191-218.
 As ultimately resolved with extensive government mediation, layoffs were allowed, but with
 managers both trying harder to find alternative employment for those to be terminated
 and increasing compensation on dismissal. See Price, supra note 35, at 216.
 58. See Sugeno, supra note 56, at 395-412; Araki, supra note 50, at 251-56; Daniel H.
 Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of?
 Stability?, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 635, 639-65 (1996). Although these commentators see the
 courts as supporting the lifetime employment commitment, they do not see the courts as
 buttressing the no-poaching commitment.
 59. Since 1896, the Japanese Civil Code has specified that an employment contraet
 without a fixed term could be ended by either party on short notice. The Labor Standards
 Act, adopted in 1947, extended the notice period to 30 days but, as a matter of statutory
 law, did not alter the Civil Code's basic employment-at-will framework. See Sugeno, supra
 note 53, at 395-98.
 60. Kazuo Sugeno 8c Yasuo Suwa, The Japanese Internal Labour Market and its Legal
 Adjustments 27 (Japan Int'l Labour Law Forum Paper No. 4, Mar. 1995) (on file with the
 Columbia Law Review).
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 "abuse of rights" doctrine that required that employers not dismiss em?
 ployees "abusively." The open-ended doctrine, eventually endorsed by
 the Japanese Supreme Court, required that any "dismissal which is not
 'objectively reasonable and socially appropriate' is . . . an abuse of the
 right to dismiss . . . ."61
 Because Japan's economy expanded during the 1960s, tests of the
 doctrine were few during that time; an expanding economy made uncer?
 tain how strongly firms were committed to lifetime employment and
 whether courts would rebuke defectors. After the 1973 oil shock, the po-
 tential bite of the judicial doctrine could be felt, however.62 Most em?
 ployers kept to the implied rules of lifetime employment. When eco?
 nomic reversals pushed firms to downsize, firms first restricted new
 hiring, then farmed out excess workers to affiliates, then suspended hir?
 ing new employees, then terminated temporary workers, and then solic-
 ited early retirement. Firms laid excess workers off only after using the
 other downsizing tools.63 The courts adopted these tools into their no-
 tion of abusive dismissal: (1) the employer must show economic need to
 downsize64; (2) the employer must exhaust alternatives to layoffs, such as
 by transferring excess employees to affiliates; and (3) the employer must
 treat workers fairly and consult with them.65
 Thus courts did not in our view enforce a longstanding preexisting
 cultural norm, but enforced the post-War practice as it had developed. A
 deal was made to end the post-War labor strife, and then courts made
 sure that one element of the deal was kept.66 Had the need for labor
 peace not led to the deal, then Japanese courts might well have defined
 abusive dismissal differently.67 Thus, courts buttressed the post-War life?
 time employment norm by raising the costs to any firm that wanted to
 change the deal.
 These two hypotheses could help to explain why firms' promises to
 their employees of lifetime employment did not erode, but they do not
 explain why firms did not start to poach on one another, thereby opening
 up the closed labor market. Our third hypothesis is that managers feared
 that poaching employees mid-career from other firms risked adversely af?
 fecting the morale of the firm's existing employees and reducing the ef-
 61. Araki, supra note 50, at 251 (internal citation omitted).
 62. See Sugeno, supra note 56, at 407-08.
 63. See id. at 409.
 64. Professors Sugeno and Suwa note that "[ajlthough in the vast majority of cases the
 court eventually upholds the management decision to implement the necessary personnel
 reduction measures, it still examines the enterprise's business circumstances in detail and
 renders its own judgment on the reasonableness of the decision." Sugeno & Suwa, supra
 note 60, at 29.
 65. See Sugeno, supra note 56, at 408-10.
 66. See Sugeno & Suwa, supra note 60, at 27, 29.
 67. The judicial rule may operate here simply to slow down change. If a future
 consensus in Japan is reached that employers must, say, downsize to be competitive,
 judicial doctrine may flexibly adjust. See Sugeno, supra note 56.
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 fectiveness ofthe internal labor market. Once firms' promises of lifetime
 employment were widespread in Japan, and once internal promotions be?
 came the normal way for employees to advance, a firm that brought in
 outsiders would risk demoralizing its own lifetime employees.
 Moreover, managers may have feared that their poaching would in-
 duce other firms to retaliate and end labor understandings, leading to
 renewed local or national labor strife. If a vibrant external labor market
 reemerged, it would have threatened their firm's internal labor market.
 True, although firms collectively wanted a weak external labor market,
 free-rider effects might have undermined managers' resolve and
 prompted firms to poach anyway, since no firm acting alone could reo?
 pen the labor market entirely. (Hence, managers would worry mostly
 about how much they would demoralize current employees by bringing
 in someone over their heads, and not worry as much about a vibrant la?
 bor market reemerging.) But although Japanese history is hazy here, col-
 lective institutions, such as the keiretsus' presidents' council on govern?
 ment action,68 could have reduced this collective action problem.
 One collective institution is the basis for our fourth hypothesis here.
 The Japanese government may have helped to destroy the external labor
 market. The government may have discouraged lateral hiring, thereby
 helping to keep the external labor market weak?a weakness that we ear?
 lier argued is critical to Japanese human capital investment. Recent ac?
 counts of Japanese corporate governance stress the government's role in
 designing governance institutions,69 and commentators stress the impor?
 tance of joint labor-management consultations at the industrial and na?
 tional levels, through industry-wide councils and study groups.70
 Although we know of no explicit government efforts to shape the anti-
 poaching principle, we do see some tantalizing evidence.71
 68. In Japan, many major firms are in keiretsu groups, in which the firms and an
 affiliated bank own one another's stock. The presidents of the affiliated firms meet
 regularly in "presidents' council" meetings to discuss common problems. See Masahiko
 Aoki, Aspects of the Japanese Firm, in The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm 3, 12
 (Masahiko Aoki ed., 1984); Michael L. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical
 Assessment, 18 J. Japanese Stud. 79, 80-81 (1992); Charles A. Anderson, Corporate
 Directors in Japan, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1984, at 30, 32.
 69. See, e.g, Aoki, supra note 30, at 236-40.
 70. See, e.g., Sugeno, supra note 56, at 475-77.
 71. Hiwatari, supra note 41, credits the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
 with a role in establishing oligopolistic structures in export industries and with
 inadvertendy creating circumstances in which cartel-like behavior to suppress the external
 labor market could be maintained. More recendy, the Japanese Ministry of Labor stated:
 "The consequences of such a policy [of allowing layoffs] would be unacceptable in Japan:
 Employment is the essential condition of social stability and the success of an enterprise cannot
 be at the expense of its employees. It's necessary to find a middle road between the
 traditional system [of lifetime employment], which remains at the heart of employment
 policy, and the new demands of the economic environment." Philippe Pons, Le
 gouvernement refuse d'autoriser les licenciements secs, Le Monde, Mar. 4, 1999, at 2, col.
 4 (emphasis added).
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 First, the Japanese government and the occupation authorities
 helped to design the trade-off that ultimately settled the post-War labor
 strife: Left-wing unions were crushed and the left curtailed politically,
 employment levels were reduced, management regained control over the
 workplace that had been lost in the late 1940s, and part ofthe labor force
 got job security. Because labor retained potential political influence de?
 spite the fact that managers recovered workplace authority in the early
 1950s, the government wanted that bargain to remain stable. Second,
 observers recount such informal government enforcement elsewhere.
 Professor Aoki sees the government as enforcing an understanding that
 the delegated main bank monitors would bail out weak affiliated indus-
 trial firms.72 Third, head-hunting activities, a standard feature of vibrant
 external labor markets, were long illegal in Japan.73 Government sup-
 pression of the external labor market warrants further investigation.74
 IV. A COMPLEMENTARY, EVOLUTIONARY LABOR MARKET MODEL
 In Part I, we argued that the human capital benefits of Japan's life?
 time employment cannot be understood apart from its complement?a
 closed labor market that shields a firm's investments in its employees'
 human capital from market mobility. In this Part, we fill in a gap in pre?
 vailing labor and institutional theory. We build on two major recent the-
 oretical contributions, one from Masahiko Aoki, who stresses the need to
 see an entire governance system rather than one attribute, and the other
 from Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, who show how complementary in?
 stitutions in a system can reinforce one another. Prevailing theory has a
 gap in that it does not yet specify how the complementary institutions
 arise. We seek here in this Part to close that gap.
 A. Complementary Institutions: Theory
 Masahiko Aoki counsels not to analyze an economic institution apart
 from related institutions. Complementary institutions function together
 72. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 32-33.
 73. See Japan to OKJob Placement Services, Jiji Press Ticker Serv., Nov. 14, 1996,
 available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File; Rieko Saito, Calls Mounting for Job
 Placement Liberalization, Kyodo News Serv., Nov. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
 Library, Non-U.S. File.
 74. Each of these hypotheses, particularly the last concerning implicit government
 support for an anti-poaching cartel, is hard to prove. We know of no formal bureaucratic
 artifacts that definitively demonstrate a governmental role in enforcing an anti-poaching
 principle. A beginning might be the 1955 founding of the Japan Productivity Center
 under the guidance of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, to enlist the
 support of labor in enhancing productivity and in promoting job security. See Sugeno,
 supra note 56, at 302; Blinder, supra note 3, at 57. But even the absence of such definitive
 artifacts (beyond our not having located references) fails to disprove the hypothesis.
 These are not understandings that the parties would want to document. And pervasive
 interaction between Japanese companies and government bureaucracies has allowed for
 informal sanctions that are quite subde.
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 and may work well only when all are in the same national economy. One
 cannot readily cherry-pick.
 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts build a theory of complementary
 institutions, institutions whose strength arises not just directly from their
 own productivity, but also from making other institutions more produc-
 tive. Greater training enhances productivity, and the value of that train?
 ing is enhanced if the machinery is designed to be especially more pro-
 ductive when operated precisely. Precise machines and well-trained labor
 are complementary. Complementary institutions shape a development
 path by favoring new institutions that increase the preexisting institu?
 tions' output.75
 B. Complementary Institutions: Selection After Lifetime Employment Becomes
 Fixed
 These theories can show how labor institutions fit and interrelate
 with the Japanese corporate governance institutions. Aoki asserts that in
 Japan, the only shareholders who can readily influence managers are the
 shareholders who are also the firm's bankers. (That is, the firm's main
 bank typically owns stock in the firm, nonbank shareholders cannot easily
 influence the firm, and the bank with an eye on its loans does not seek
 pure shareholder wealth maximization.) This subdues pure shareholder
 influence, thereby protecting workers from the opportunism of share?
 holders who might want to end implicit contracts midstream.76 (Since we
 believe the Japanese firm makes the bulk of the human capital invest?
 ment, we may not agree with Aoki on this element of the model.) But in
 this model, managers are not free from all accountability in that main
 bank contingent governance prevents managers from wandering too far
 from profitability.77 (That is, banks in this model do not tightly control
 managers, but if the contingency of sustained bad results arises, the main
 bank intervenes inside the firm, often taking board seats and direct influ?
 ence.) The firm lacks monitoring from a pure shareholder, but Aoki
 states that the bank will interfere when the company performs poorly, but
 75. See Milgrom 8c Roberts, supra note 1, at 34; Paul Milgrom 8c John Roberts,
 Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational Change in
 Manufacturing, 19 J. Acct. 8c Econ. 179, 179-206 (1995); Paul Milgrom &John Roberts,
 The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization, 80
 Am. Econ. Rev. 511, 518-27 (1990). Milgrom's and Roberts's analysis of Japan is
 deliberately static; they do not try to find the path that explains how the system took its
 current form: " [W] e . . . interpret the . . . Japanese economy as emerging from coherent
 practices in an environment rife with complementarities. That . . . allow[s] us to avoid
 issues of how the diverse decision-makers are led to pursue coherent policies and focuses
 instead on why the policies are coherent." Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 1, at 19.
 76. The incentives of a banker-shareholder who is a lender differ from a pure
 shareholder's incentives; its aversion to risk more nearly matches the preferences of
 employees than those of pure shareholders.
 77. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 18; Garvey & Swan, supra note 1, at 266; Milgrom &
 Roberts, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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 usually not otherwise. This forbearance-unless-performance-is-poor moti-
 vates both managers and workers to perform, to maintain their autonomy
 from banker-shareholders.78
 Similarly, labor institutions fit with one another. Although lifetime
 employment might dilute employees' incentives to perform, this job se?
 curity is offset by the large size of workers' bonuses relative to their fixed
 wages and by an internal tournament in which better performing employ?
 ees are promoted and the others are not.79 Security in one area; insecu-
 rity in another. And these attributes help support teamwork and horizon-
 tal information sharing. Existing institutions attract their complements,
 because adding a complement increases the productivity of preexisting
 parts of the system, and the increasing returns thereby create path
 dependency.80
 Two other features?the early retirement age and the closure of the
 external labor market?also are complements. Early retirement at fifty-
 five is odd in isolation, because older Japanese employees, in whom the
 firm has invested so much, should be especially valuable. But if the firm
 cannot easily remove sub-par employees earlier, then the low retirement
 age caps lifetime employment, making it less lifetime than it first appears;
 the cap allows the firm to select a few stars for senior positions from its
 white collar managers and for leadership positions among blue collar em?
 ployees; the other 55-year-old employees leave to make room for new en-
 trants. The best employees stay, some from the managerial ranks becom-
 ing directors of the company; the others leave.
 78. See Masahiko Aoki et. al., The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory
 Overview, in The Japanese Main Bank System 3, 24-26 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick
 eds., 1994).
 Japanese bank shareholding may partly depend on lifetime employment. True, the
 main bank system also has its own historical roots, roots not directly connected with
 lifetime employment. Hoshi shows that postwar main bank relations grew directly out of
 the authoritative wartime allocation of defense companies to particular banks. See Hoshi,
 Cleaning-up, supra note 30, at 307. A question worth future investigation is whether the
 main bank stock ownership (1) arose independently of labor turmoil, (2) arose as a
 complement to lifetime employment, or (3) arose simultaneously with or after lifetime
 employment.
 79. See Eugene Kandel & Neil Pearson, The Value of Labor Market Flexibility
 (Bradley Policy Research Center Working Paper FR 95-04, University of Rochester 23,
 1995) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Prendergast explains that slow promotion in
 early stages of employees' careers maintains incentives to participate in the promotion
 tournament. Early promotion of some employees would tell others that they themselves
 are less likely to succeed, and would thereby dilute their incentive to perform. Slow
 promotion for all employees conceals this information and maintains incentives. See
 Canice Prendergast, Career Development and Specific Human Capital Collection, 6 J.
 Japanese & Int'l Econ. 207, 220-21 (1992). Destruction of the external labor market is
 also critical because an external offer could tell employees they are on their way (or not),
 similarly dampening incentives.
 80. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 14-18; Masahiko Aoki, An Evolving Diversity of
 Organizational Mode and its Implications for Transitional Economies, 9 J. Japanese & Int'l
 Economies 330, 350-52 (1995); Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 1.
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 Moreover, we believe it is the closure of the external labor market
 that does the work: "Q]apanese firms, particularly large and established
 ones, have bound themselves to an implicit code of not hiring former
 employees of other firms, particularly skilled ones . . . ."81 With lifetime
 employment in place, it became socially plausible for business to cartelize
 the labor market, an action that would have been explosive in Japan in
 the late 1940s, and explosive in the U.S. at any time.
 But where does a system's evolution begin? Any starting point is po-
 tentially arbitrary, but Japan's history helps to specify a plausible one.
 Lifetime employment arose as part of a politically influenced bargain,
 then it attracted its complements, such as the destruction of the external
 labor market, performance bonuses and internal tournaments with steep
 seniority wages, main bank contingent monitoring, promotion at the top
 to the inside board, and retirement at fifty-five. Japan reached a labor
 market equilibrium, one that it failed to reach during the interwar years,
 and one whose initial baseline features came about to reduce social
 turmoil.82
 A nation that began from a different starting point, say one that like
 the United States valued autonomy and mobility, might evolve quite
 differently.
 C. How Do Labor Markets Reach Equilibrium?
 How could Japan attain an equilibrium with firms' investing in em?
 ployees' industry-specific human capital? Firms in a fluid external labor
 market would poach from other firms that train, thereby breaking down a
 training equilibrium. Either employees pay for training themselves or no
 one pays. Because a socially worthwhile investment is not made, a nation
 is poorer overall unless it can break the cycle of poaching and job-
 hopping.
 81. Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy
 83 (1988).
 82. Stable employment in the United States came from back-loaded wages based on
 seniority and from reputation effects that tended to bind firms in fluid labor markets. Yet,
 even if the American and Japanese results were identical (they are not), one would want to
 know how each nation reached its labor equilibrium. In the United States, rapid growth
 tended to make firms pay market wages (to recruit new workers) and made reputation
 important. In Japan, firms tried to get to that combination, but failed during the interwar
 years; after World War II, Japan stabilized employment to promote labor peace. From
 there (subsequently or simultaneously), features were added in Japan that made the
 equilibrium work. This difference of historical background between the United States and
 Japan is reflected in the different assessments of the development of the internal labor
 market. While the internal labor market in Japan is generally seen as supporting comity
 between workers and managers, some commentators see it as having developed even in the
 United States "to maximize the power of employers over workers." Katherine Stone, The
 Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry, in Labor Market Segmentation 27, 28
 (David Gordon et al. eds., 1975). Price, supra note 35, at 259-61, appears to share Stone's
 view with respect to Japan.
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 Our political story helps to explain how Japan did it. A direct govern?
 ment order to bar job-hopping would have been politically explosive. But
 for purposes extrinsic to the economic deal, a nation and its leading
 firms may agree with sectors of labor that their employment will be life?
 time. In that setting, it would have been easier for employers to close the
 external labor market in ways that they could not have closed it previ-
 ously. With the external market closed, firms more willingly invested in
 their employees' human capital. Once the employees were well-trained,
 the firms had no reason to fire them, because the employees' newly-devel-
 oped human capital made them valuable to the firms. As long as the
 economy did not systematically degrade the value of the decades of
 human capital investment, the lifetime employment deal became self-en-
 forcing: Firms did not want to fire their high-value employees, and they
 willingly kept the promises they made of lifetime employment.
 V. Secondary Economic Characteristics of Lifetime Employment
 For the sake of completeness, we note in this Part some potential
 indirect, secondary effects (or causes) of lifetime employment. None are
 critical to the main argument we have made.
 A. Lifetime Employment as a Simple Contract Term
 Lifetime employment might simply be an employee benefit with no
 economic function other than compensation. Or, lifetime employment
 could be part of mutual gift-giving: The firm promises lifetime employ?
 ment and the affected employees work harder at all their tasks.83 Note
 though that this role is tied to effort rather than skills acquisition; it fos-
 ters employee skills only as part of an across-the-board increase in em?
 ployee effort.
 B. Lifetime Employment as Indirectly Supporting Employees' Investment in
 Developing Their Own Human Capital
 To encourage investment in firm-specific human capital, a firm
 might develop a reputation for not reneging on paying employees a re?
 turn on the employees' own investment. (This is secondary because the
 interesting characteristic of the Japanese system is \h^t firms, not employ?
 ees, pay for human capital.) If a firm reneged on its promised return to
 employees, some employees might accept the result, but others would
 complain and become unproductive. A firm not committed to lifetime
 employment could fire the grousers and keep the pliable employees.
 Lifetime employment makes the firm live with the grousers and therefore
 83. See George Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 QJ. Econ. 543,
 548-55 (1982); Marleen A. O'Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach to the Japanese
 Corporate Governance Structure, 50 Wash. 8c Lee L. Rev. 1529, 1533 (1993).
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 makes the firm less likely to renege on its promise to pay for the employ?
 ees' investment in developing their human capital.84
 Second, consider the possibility that employees invest in their own
 human capital. They do not know which product markets will be valuable
 in the future. The firm will usually have a better estimate of their product
 market's future, but if employees make the investment (presumably via
 lower wages), employees may be wary that they will invest and, if the mar?
 ket turns sour, the firm will lay them off. But a firm that promises the
 employee a lifetime job, it might be argued, could thereby make more
 credible its statement that the market for its product is likely to be a good
 market over the long run; hence, employees would arguably be more will?
 ing to invest their time (and forego wages) while developing skills for that
 market.85 The firm's insuring the employees' investment, by promising
 the employees a lifetime job even if the product market collapses, signals
 to employees that the firm, with better information about the product
 market's future, expects the skills to be valuable for a generation.
 But we doubt that information signalling is a primary function of
 lifetime employment, because the firm's insurance is only partial, since
 Japanese wages are variable, with a large profit-based bonus.86 The firm
 might insure product-specific skills, but employees "pay" the "deductible"
 of potentially lower wages. And it is yet to be seen how lifetime employ?
 ment will fare when product markets (and the need for the underlying
 technical skills) become more volatile.87 Lastly, once again, the core is?
 sue to explain here is whether lifetime employment supports the firms'
 investment in their employees' human capital, which we believe it would
 not.88
 84. If this were lifetime employment's prineipal function, however, one would expect
 its incidence to vary from firm to firm, rather than follow a consistent pattern throughout a
 nation's economy for privileged labor sectors. The variance would be due to some firms
 having other means to achieve a reputation for nonexploitation, and to the fact that not all
 firms need high levels of firm-specific human capital.
 85. Employers usually are better informed about product markets than employees.
 See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies 66 (1975); Paul Willman, Opportunism in
 Labour Contracting: An Application of the Organisational Failures Framework, 3 J. Econ.
 Behav. & Org. 83, 86 (1982). So, if lifetime employment reduced employees' mistrust of
 the firm's request to "pay" for specified skills, the benefits may not be trivial.
 86. See Masanori Hashimoto, Bonus Payments, On-the-Job Training, and Lifetime
 Employment in Japan, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1086 (1979).
 87. See Ronald Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
 Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327, 343 (1996); Ronald Gilson, Reflections in a
 Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 Colum.
 Bus. L. Rev. 203, 207-08.
 88. Another information asymmetry is relevant, although most relevant to the earlier
 analysis in fluid labor markets. Information asymmetries between firms and employees
 render real-world labor markets imperfect and, hence, employees cannot depend on a
 perfectly fluid labor market. When the employing firm is better informed about the
 employees' actual skill development than others in the labor market, mobility will not be
 perfecdy smooth. While the skills involved may be general, a competitor considering
 hiring the training firm's employee may be unable to observe the quality of the potential
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 C. Lifetime Employment as Induced by Other Goals
 Lifetime employment might be a consequence of other labor practices.
 A firm may make workers multiskilled, so that the workers are unafraid of
 eliminating their own jobs by making technical suggestions. Multiskilled
 workers then move internally from job to job and appear to have lifetime
 employment, but the appearance of lifetime employment only derives
 from their multiple skills.89 Of course, the firm that has made lifetime
 promises for political purposes?our view of the situation?may multiskill
 its workers to keep them valuable over their lifetimes. Finding multiskil?
 led employees and lifetime employment in the same economy does not
 reveal which direction the causality runs.
 Or implicit deals may have wages low early in a career, and high later
 in a career. The higher-wage employees are immobile because they can?
 not do better elsewhere, and if the firm does not renege, employment
 appears to be long-term, maybe lifetime. In America this pattern gave
 stability to employment for several decades even without Japanese-style
 semiformal "lifetime" employment.
 VI. Two Brief Comparisons: Germany and the United States
 A similar evolutionary story of a political decision giving rise to an
 institution that then evoked economic reaction and evolution can be
 seen in German labor and corporate history. American institutions
 evolved differendy, probably because the need for political peace (or the
 manner of achieving it) was not the same in the United States.
 employee's skills. As such, a potential poacher will reduce its wage offer to account for this
 information asymmetry: The employer will offer a wage based on the average skill level of
 those employees willing to leave, reflecting a mixture of higher and lower skilled workers.
 To that extent, even general human capital is operationally specific, and the same problems
 of opportunism reappear. Acemoglu and Pischke stress information asymmetries as
 debilitating the external labor market to explain why employers might pay for general
 training. See Acemoglu 8c Pischke, supra note 12, at 79-82. To the extent that the market
 wage is lower than a skilled worker's marginal product because of information
 asymmetries, the employer earns a return on investing in general human capital even
 when paying the market wage. Bruce Greenwald also considers the connection between an
 employer's information advantage and the incentive to invest in general human capital.
 See Bruce Greenwald, Adverse Selection in the Labor Market, 53 Rev. Econ. Stud. 325, 341
 (1986). Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin, however, rely on information asymmetry to
 explain general training of law firm associates. See Ronald Gilson 8c Robert Mnookin,
 Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41
 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 577-78 (1989).
 Information asymmetries create a winner's curse: The poaching employer may not
 recruit an employee with average skill level, but only low-skilled employees whom the
 previous employer, with better information concerning the extent of the employee's
 general skills, chose not to retain. See Robert Gibbons 8c Laurence Katz, Layoffs and
 Lemons, 9 J. Labor Econ. 351, 352-53 (1991).
 89. See H. Lorne Carmichael 8c W. Bendey MacLeod, Multiskilling, Technical Change
 and the Japanese Firm, 103 Econ. J. 142, 144 (1993).
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 A. German Parallels?
 Like Japanese lifetime employment, German codetermination, by
 which German employees select half of the board of directors in large
 German firms, has a political component, arising from socialist ideologies
 and revolutionary conflict. Its first pale features appeared during Ger-
 many's post-World War I turmoil, when Red Berlin was run by revolu-
 tionaries, as one piece of a grand compromise in 1919 between the right
 and the left that brought Germany temporary political stability. At the
 same time, a German ideology apart from interest group deals preferred
 a "middle way" between socialism and capitalism.90
 After World War II, the occupying powers expanded codetermina?
 tion in the steel and coal industries, pardy at the behest of France and
 Britain. In 1976, after a series of strikes and seven years of public debate
 about conflicting models proposed by different political parties, the Ger?
 man Bundestag expanded codetermination, presumably to foster indus-
 trial peace. Like Japanese lifetime employment, codetermination
 originated not in the economics of production, nor even in the econom?
 ics of firm-level corporate governance: "Rather, its purpose was to bridge
 the gap between capital and labor in society, or to provide social govern?
 ance over private capital."91
 Because of codetermination, German firms' managers and stock-
 holders probably reduced the flow of information into the supervisory
 board, had it meet less often, and minimized its functions.92 Supervisory
 board committees were set up, with labor less well represented on the
 committees than it was on the full boards, or the office of the chair (who
 comes from the shareholder-side) was enhanced.93 Big stockholder
 blocks might have persisted in Germany as a key complementary govern?
 ance institution because the boards were, due to codetermination, left
 weak by managers and stockholders.94
 B. American Contrasts
 The Japanese setting in which lifetime employment arose?during
 the post-War suffering and starvation?contrasts with the American eco-
 90. See Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice?Social Responsibility and the Liberal State
 397 (1991); Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of
 Germany, 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 111, 117-18 (1988).
 91. Katharina Pistor, Co-determination in Germany: A Socio-Political Model with
 Governance Externalities, in Employees' Role in Corporate Governance, supra note 41; see
 Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 383, 411-12 (1990).
 92. Or, despite competitive pressures from a common market and a globalizing
 economy to energize board performance?pressures readily seen in the United States?
 German managers and shareholders may have kept an already low-key supervisory board
 weak and low-key, while boards in the United States were becoming more aggressive.
 93. See Pistor, supra note 91, at 394.
 94. See Mark Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998
 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 167, 170-77.
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 nomic setting following World War II, when the release of pent-up de?
 mand created a labor shortage. Job security in the United States was not
 a political issue because the external labor market and unemployment
 compensation protected workers. In the postwar United States, wages
 eventually became rigid downward. Japan, in contrast, had fixed employ?
 ment for some but left wages variable.
 Rather than inducing human capital investment by fixing employ?
 ment and varying wages, U.S. employers are said to fix wages by foregoing
 downward adjustments and to vary employment by laying off employees
 in less profitable periods. An employer who claims bad times to justify a
 wage cut may be falsely portraying that its business has worsened. How?
 ever, a firm that lays off employees because of bad times reduces not just
 its wage bill, but also its output. If the firm's business is not really bad,
 then layoffs also would hurt the firm, and thus the firm's representation
 is made credible. Although ex post the pain may be borne disproportion?
 ately by those laid off, the ex ante implicit bargain?wage rigidity with
 layoffs possible?makes the firm's reaction more credible in the U.S. con?
 text than wage flexibility.95
 Thus, we see multiple institutional packages: In Japan, human capi?
 tal requires fixed employment in a closed labor market, but wages are
 variable; in the United States, human capital requires fixed wages, but
 jobs are mobile. We explain the contrary institutional packages as due to
 each beginning from different starting positions. Japanese postwar poli-
 95. Edward Rock and Michael Wachter state the point clearly. Asymmetric
 information explains the observed behavior of firms in response to cyclical changes in
 output:
 [American] firms typically reduce employment rather than wage rates.
 Information about product market conditions is known to the employer but not
 to the employee. The employer informs its employees about product market
 conditions indirectly through changes in output and thus employment levels. If a
 firm could lower wages in response to a decline in its product market, it would
 have an incentive to misstate the condition of its product market in order to
 lower wage rates. The incentive-compatible rule is for the firm to lay off workers.
 Because the result of layoffs is a reduction in output, and hence a reduction in
 the firm's revenues and profits, such a rule eliminates the firm's incentives to
 misstate information.
 Edward Rock 8c Michael Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit Between
 Employees and Shareholders in Employees' Role in Corporate Governance, supra note 41;
 see also Ronald Ehrenberg 8c Robert Smith, Modern Labor Economics 586 (6th ed. 1997)
 (discussing the positive effects of layoffs on workers' productivity); Costas Azariadis,
 Employment with Asymmetric Information, 98 Q.J. Econ., Supp. 1983, at 157 (same);
 Sanford Grossman 8c Oliver Hart, Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment,
 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 301 (1981) (using economic models to show that asymmetric
 information increases unemployment, relative to situations where marginal product
 information is public).
 The contrast to Japan is striking. Professor Hiwatari describes the Japanese response
 to cyclical changes in output: "[AJfter the first oil crisis, the unions of oligopolistic firms in
 export industries . . . accepted wage restraint. . . . In exchange for wage moderation, large
 corporations maintained their commitment to employment." Hiwatari, supra note 41.
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 tics fixed one piece?stable employment?and induced complementary
 adjustments in other parts of the labor package. For the United States, a
 cultural preference for mobility fixed one piece, and institutions evolved
 that provided economic incentives for more stability and less mobility.
 VII. Today's Stress Points
 A system with complementary institutions can grow quickly because
 increasing one input makes the complements more productive. But com?
 plementarity has an ominous downside. When external changes devalue
 an attribute's contribution, the system's productivity may dramatically de?
 cline, because the other attributes of the system were built to use the now-
 less-important attribute. Stress points arise, and in Japan, one stress point
 is the firm's relation to its employees.
 A. Internal Labor Markets and Growth
 We have outlined a political and economic account of the Japanese
 labor market. First, to stabilize politics in postwar Japan and to defeat
 leftist unions, firms agreed to lifetime employment for a key labor sector.
 Second, lifetime employment, however, reduced employee incentives,
 and lifetime employment with an active external labor market could have
 especially reduced the firm's incentives to invest in employee human capi?
 tal because, once trained, employees could have expropriated the em?
 ployer's investment by taking another higher paying job. Third, firms
 reacted to lifetime employment's negative incentives by, we hypothesized,
 forming an implicit labor cartel, perhaps with government enforcement,
 to constrict the external labor market. The end of the external labor
 market motivated firms to pay to develop their employees' skills. Fourth,
 firms made the bonus a big part of compensation, with the bonus keyed
 to firm profitability. Firms also built internal tournaments that promoted
 the most motivated and skilled employees, and firms developed transfer
 policies to put good but redundant employees into affiliated companies
 and to place underperforming and redundant employees in dead-end
 "window" seats that punished the underperforming lifetime employees.
 This model works best in expanding firms that can run promotional
 tournaments more successfully. Growth assures enough winners that em?
 ployees want to play. Growth also allows the firm to bring in many entry-
 level workers, some of whom will have the talent to become the senior
 managers and senior employees of the firm's future.
 This last point warrants elaboration. A firm's future success depends
 on selecting skilled workers and managers for promotion. When first hir-
 ing, the firm can only crudely identify skill levels from the resume. Inter?
 nal tournaments identify the managers who will run the firm in the next
 generation. The firm must recruit many to uncover the few who have the
 talent for the senior managerial and labor positions of tomorrow.
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 Consider the crunch when growth ends for a firm with many perma?
 nent employees. The firm cannot expand; it cuts new hiring, because
 incumbent lifetime employees can handle the static workload. But by
 cutting hiring, it constricts the stream of junior employees from whom it
 would select its future leaders. Lifetime employees clog the promotional
 filters and reduce their effectiveness.96 The result: Firms lack skilled
 managers and employees in the right leadership positions because the
 tournaments become less meaningful (when no one is going upward any-
 way), and the firm is also less able to insure the value of workers' human
 capital with permanent employment at historic wage levels. The system is
 tense.
 Our model here thus gives structure to the view that the Japanese
 labor model is unstable.97 The model may also give texture to the view in
 Japan that it has a bicycle economy?one that moves swiftly with grace
 but, at slow speeds, cannot maintain its balance. If promotional tourna?
 ments make lifetime employment work and if promotional tournaments
 function poorly when many large firms are not expanding, then many
 Japanese firms and the Japanese economy face problems.98
 B. Flexibility
 Technological change causes stress. The American and the foreign
 systems are both flexible, but at different levels. American governance
 has more "macro"-flexibility, because the external capital market presses
 for change and, lacking large shareholdings that facilitate credible com-
 mitments to a firm's employees, American firms have fewer commit-
 ments. Because the United States has a strong external labor market,
 workers pay for more of their general and industry-specific human capi?
 tal, and workers lose when their skills become obsolete.
 The Japanese system lacks "macro"-flexibility; its commitment to life?
 time employment slows down big, rapid adjustments. But it has stronger
 "micro"-flexibility, in that it can induce greater commitments to human
 capital, which some American firms cannot induce, and Japanese employ?
 ees can move and adapt well to modest technological change. Although
 today American macro-flexibility looks fine, it is not obvious which set of
 costs and benefits yields more over time.99
 96. We realize that the timing of blue collar and white collar lifetime employment in
 Japan may have differed, as might the range of causes.
 97. See Foote, supra note 58, at 699-706; Sugeno 8c Suwa, supra note 60, at 44-46.
 98. See, e.g., Kazuo Sugeno 8c Yasuo Suwa, Labour Law Issues in a Changing Labour
 Market: In Search of a New Support System, in Japanese Labour and Management in
 Transition: Diversity, Flexibility and Participation 53 (Mari Sako 8c Hiroki Sato eds., 1997)
 (arguing that global competition and a decreasing labor supply will lead to changes in the
 lifetime employment system).
 99. The trade-off is less between flexibility versus commitment than it is between
 micro-flexibility, at the level of the worker, versus macro-flexibility, at the level of the firm.
 The former effectively responds to moderate change; the latter responds to radical change.
 See Aoki, supra note 1; Gilson, Reflections, supra note 87.
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 C. Industrial Districts and Local Employment
 Industrial districts can relieve some stress of human capital invest?
 ments even where employment mobility is high. The districts can de-
 crease the costs to the employee of moving to another firm, thereby re?
 ducing the risk of employer opportunism with respect to industry-specific
 human capital, and, by limiting mobility to the district, also reduce the
 risk of employee opportunism. Similarly, lifetime employment with a
 weak external labor market may encourage skills investment at times, but
 be undesirable in cultures like America's, which value mobility and au?
 tonomy. When skills development becomes critical in a system with a sig?
 nificant external labor market, we hypothesize that the "demand" for in?
 dustrial districts, like Silicon Valley, will rise.
 When would employees invest in industry-specific skills without get-
 ting either soft commitments from their employer of a secure job or gov?
 ernance rights inside the firm? An employee who can move to another
 firm without giving up his or her family and local social structure and
 without having to change residences would worry less about employer op?
 portunism: the lower the transaction costs of changingjobs, the smaller
 the firm-specific component of otherwise general or industry-specific
 human capital. Low-cost job change works most easily when similar firms
 cluster.
 If you left Texas Instruments [which is not in Silicon Valley] for
 another job, it was a major psychological move, all the way to
 one coast or the other, or at least as far as Phoenix. Out here
 [in the Valley], it wasn't that big a catastrophe to quit your job
 on Friday and have another job on Monday .... You just drove
 off in another direction on Monday morning. You didn't have
 to sell your house, and your kids didn't have to change
 schools.100
 Thus, industrial districts fit industries with high industry-specific
 human capital needs better than they fit other industries. They reduce
 human capital dilemmas exactly contrary to the way prevailing in Japan:
 Enhancing the external labor market enhances employees' incentives to
 invest in their human capital, and employment is made even more imper-
 manent by the easy switching inside the district.
 In contrast, where labor is geographically immobile?as it is by choice,
 culture, or language in many other nations?industry-specific skills turn
 into firm-specific skills (because an industry-specific skill cannot be used
 elsewhere, since the employee cannot, or will not, move), thereby exacer-
 bating the firm's potential for opportunism. If the mill at which the steel-
 workers work is the only one in town and the workers are averse to mov?
 ing to another town with another steel mill, then the firm "owns" the
 employees' skills. If this immobility characterizes Japanese (and Ger-
 100. Anna Lee Saxanian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon
 Valley and Route 128, at 35 (1994) (quoting a Silicon Valley engineer).
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 man) economic history?a cultural aversion to mobility greater than that
 in the United States and fewer "industrial districts"?then we have a more
 refined explanation for greater employee governance rights there than
 here.101
 Conclusion
 Japanese firms' promise of lifetime employment to their employees
 is conventionally seen as central to Japanese firms' willingness to invest
 heavily in their employees' skills. This presents an attractive picture for
 America in that an institution that employees would want would at the
 same time contribute to productivity. But both theoretical analysis and
 raw political history tell us that the story is too good to be true.
 Lifetime employment originated more in postwar conservative polit?
 ical efforts to stymie a broad-scale labor coalition or in management's
 efforts to stymie factory-level unions than in the economics of human cap?
 ital development. This political origin then shaped how related labor
 and corporate governance institutions developed in Japan, attracting
 complements like a closed labor market.
 A firm's promise to employees of lifetime employment does not di?
 rectly motivate either the firm or the employees to invest in firm-specific,
 industry-specific, or general skills, because it fails to eliminate employees'
 rational fears of firm opportunism in lowering wages or in promoting
 fewer people later. Japanese firms seem well suited to be opportunistic
 here, because Japanese wages are variable. True, a firm's opportunism
 could be muted by the firm's paying for the employees' skills, and pay?
 ment by the firm in Japan is the human capital feature to be explained.
 But payment by the firm risks employee opportunism in taking away from
 the firm skills that the employee can use elsewhere; hence, it is the crip-
 pling of the external labor market that explains why firms in Japan were
 less wary than otherwise of paying to develop high skills in their employ?
 ees. The weak external labor market made firms face less employee and
 competitor opportunism, because neither employees nor competitors
 can appropriate the returns on the firm's investments. Thus, optimistic
 accounts of Japanese labor relations?that the sunny-side of lifetime em?
 ployment induces employees and firms to invest better in generic and
 firm-specific skills?are exaggerated. More plausibly, if any factor is in
 play besides an expanding economy for most of the postwar period, it is
 the "dark" side of a limited labor market that accounts for the greater
 investment.
 101. The politics of codetermination in Germany fits our production model:
 Geographic immobility rendered industry-specific human capital firm-specific and thereby
 heightened the demand for employee involvement in corporate governance. This
 heightened demand could have expressed itself in contract negotiations and in political
 demands as well. We could then change our model?with politics independent of the
 production?to make production affect politics.
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